WA Libel Case: Exner vs. American Medical Association (AMA)

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SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:

 [***1] 

Petition for Rehearing Denied December 31, 1974. Review Denied by Supreme
Court February 25, 1975.

PRIOR HISTORY:

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 685342,
Robert M. Elston, J., entered April 13, 1973.

DISPOSITION:
Affirmed.

HEADNOTES:

 

[1] Libel and Slander — Meaning of Words — Determination. For the purposes of the law of defamation, words and phrases should be
construed in the sense in which they would ordinarily be understood; doubtful
terms are not presumed to be derogatory.

 

[2] Libel and Slander — Uncomplimentary Meaning — Effect. Communications that are uncomplimentary or critical are not, by that fact,
defamatory, nor is a legitimate report of the communication, even though the
result is to adversely affect a person’s reputation.

 

[3] Libel and Slander — Public Figure — What Constitutes — Effect. A person who voluntarily abandons anonymity and attempts to become identified
with and to influence an issue of widespread public interest becomes a
public figure in relation to that issue and to the extent of his involvement
therein. Such a public figure may not recover for an otherwise defamatory
falsehood without showing
 [***2]  knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity.

 

[4] Libel and Slander — Summary Judgment — Requirements — Malice. The summary judgment
requirements as to a genuine issue and to favorable inferences are the same in
defamation cases as other cases. In addition, a plaintiff must present
evidence, in order to resist a summary judgment for the defendant, that will
establish a prima facie case with convincing clarity.
Reckless disregard for truth or falsity is established for summary judgment
purposes by evidence that will establish that the defendant had a serious doubt
as to the truth of the publication.

SYLLABUS: Action for defamation. The plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment in favor
of the defendants.

COUNSEL:
Frederick B. Exner, pro se.

Detels, Draper
& Marinkovich, Frank W. Draper, Williams, Lanza, Kastner
& Gibbs, and
Peter E. Peterson, for respondents.

JUDGES: Callow, J. Swanson, C.J., and Horowitz, J., concur.

OPINIONBY: CALLOW

OPINION:

 [*215] 

 [**865]  The plaintiff, Dr. Frederick Exner, brought suit claiming he had suffered
damages from allegedly defamatory

 [*216]  statements made in an article by the defendant Goulding, Director
 [***3]  of Public Information for the American Dental Association. The article
appeared October 1965 in the American Medical Association’s journal,
“Today’s
Health,” and is published as an appendix to this opinion save for those deletions which
could be made in the interest of brevity without affecting the substance and
flavor of the article.

Historical Background

For a number of years there has been a great deal of controversy over the
fluoridation of public water supplies as a dental health measure. The
plaintiff has been an active opponent of fluoridation for over two decades and
has, by his own statement, devoted considerable time, effort and resources to
this cause. He has written books and magazine articles, lectured, and
participated in court actions, both as a litigant and as an expert witness, on
the subject of fluoridation. The American Dental
Association and the American Medical Association have been in favor of
fluoridation.

 [**866]  Pleadings And Proceedings

The plaintiff’s complaint claimed that the defendants conspired to defame him
by publication of the article. The defendants denied that the statements were
defamatory and raised state and federal constitutional
 [***4]  protections of free speech in defense. The plaintiff was represented by
counsel
during the early stages of the proceedings but has represented himself during
the hearing on the motions for summary judgment brought by the defendants and
on this appeal. Following a hearing on the motions, a consideration of the
depositions and other evidence presented, and the argument of counsel and the
plaintiff, the trial court concluded the article itself was
not defamatory. The trial court also held that the evidence presented was
insufficient to support a determination that the defendants published the
article with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether
it was false or true. The plaintiff

 [*217]  claims that summary judgment should not have been granted as genuine issues of
material fact were involved.

Was The Article Defamatory?

The initial examination that
must be made is whether or not the article was defamatory. Its introductory
paragraphs make it clear that its purpose is to discuss and evaluate the
motives of the opponents of fluoridation. These paragraphs state that the
people to be discussed
“range from the sincere to the charlatan, from the confused
 [***5]  to the quack.” The writer, having planted this prologue in the mind of the reader, then
proceeds to a discussion of the motives behind
several factions of the opposition to fluoridation.

[1, 2] Following a paragraph on the attitude of some chiropractors towards
fluoridation, the writer then states that the plaintiff is
“Perhaps the most frequently quoted ‘professional’ opponent to fluoridation . . .” The plaintiff asserts that the use of the term
“professional” was libelous. The term
“professional” can mean many things. It
can be construed as sarcasm or to be complimentary. We note that the
dictionaries do not recognize a sarcastic implication. In this case, the word
could be interpreted as calling the plaintiff
“professional” in terms of his background as a medical practitioner, or in his fulltime
devotion of his energies to resisting fluoridation, or in the manner in which
he had successfully opposed
fluoridation proposals. The reader might give the term any one of these
constructions even though it has been placed in quotes in the article. Terms,
however, should be construed in the sense in which they would ordinarily be
understood.
McNair v. Hearst Corp., 494
 [***6]  F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1974);
Amsbury v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wn.2d 733, 458 P.2d 882 (1969);
Purvis v. Bremer’s, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 743, 344 P.2d 705 (1959). When the reader is left to decide for himself whether the term
“professional” is meant to imply that the person
referred to is in a profession such as medicine, law, the clergy or the
military, is totally committed to his cause, is expert and businesslike, or is
a practitioner of the
“world’s oldest profession”

 [*218]  — resolving any ambiguity in favor of a disparaging connotation is not
justified. The apparently intended meaning was to denote the plaintiff as a
completely devoted
but overly zealous opponent. This could be taken by some as uncomplimentary,
but the implications were not defamatory.
Dowling v. Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321, 66 N.W. 225 (1896).

The plaintiff next challenges the use of the word
“Exner’s” being substituted in parentheses for the word
“these” with respect to the discussion of the
reviews of the book he co-authored on the hazards of fluoridation. It is true
that the book reviews attacked the book forcefully. The defendant-writer of
the article likewise attacked the ideas and results
 [***7]  achieved by the plaintiff in his opposition to fluoridation. The opinions
expressed in the book reviews and the comments of the defendant in the article
were justified
even

 [**867]  though the statements were fuel adding to the
“heat of the kitchen” to which the plaintiff has exposed his beliefs. The comments in the article
on the book reviews amount to no more than reiteration of the criticism voiced
by the reviewers of the book. These comments did not result in defamation. If
it were otherwise, every book reviewer who found fault with an
author’s performance rather than applauding his work would be subject to suit.
Reviewers who attack the contents of a literary work, as these reviewers did,
rather than engaging in personal villification cannot be held to have defamed
the author.
Merivale v. Carson, [1887] 20 Q.B.D. 275;
Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 A. 411 (1896). Authors are not entitled to protection for a thin skin, and critics are not
required to tread lightly. It follows that neither are those who only report
what such a reviewer has said.
Fisher v. Washington Post Co., 212 A.2d 335 (D.C. App. 1965);
Fitzgerald v. Hopkins, 70 Wn.2d 924, 425 P.2d
 [***8]  920 (1967); 3 Restatement of Torts
§§ 606, 609 (1938); 1 F. Harper
& F. James,
The Law of Torts
§ 5.28 (1956).

The allegation that Dr. Exner was defamed because he was mentioned along with
others who may have been characterized

 [*219]  in a disparaging manner in the article is not defamatory towards him of itself
and does not indicate malice specifically directed towards him. The article
did not condemn all who opposed fluoridation in a derogatory manner but
separately commented upon each group of opponents to
fluoridation and proceeded to analyze the considerations that impelled each
group. We find that the article, while attempting to cast doubt upon the
soundness of the concepts espoused by the plaintiff, did not attempt to
personally disgrace him or diminish the esteem in which he was held in the
community. It is true that a reader of the article might be persuaded that the
position of the plaintiff on the subject of fluoridation was wrong. This does
not amount to defamation, however, even though rejection of one’s theories by
others does not enhance that person’s reputation.
See
Walker v. D’Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 129 A.2d 148, 64 A.L.R.2d 231 (1957);
Cohen
 [***9]  v. Cowles Publishing Co., 45 Wn.2d 262, 273 P.2d 893 (1954), and the cases discussed therein.

The article did mistakenly report that of those members of the King County
Medical Society voting in a poll on the subject, 706 were for fluoridation and
68 were against. The actual
vote was 595 in favor and 166 against fluoridation. There is no evidence that
this mistake was other than inadvertent or that it was material. This
apparently unintentional mistake does not indicate malice.

The article finally proceeds to attack on a more personal basis others who
opposed fluoridation and then states that those who have fought fluoridation
(characterizing
some as
“convicted
quacks, or hate mongers, or food fadists”) have fought fluoridation with astonishing success. The article concludes
that the scientists, health agencies, family physicians, and dentists who have
supported fluoridation have been beaten not because of any question about the
effectiveness or safety of fluoridation but because
“men like this have been able to confuse, frighten, and mislead.” These

 [*220]  statements were not
directed against the plaintiff specifically and did not malign him personally.

We consider
 [***10]  the article to have commented fairly on the plaintiff’s position on
fluoridation and not to have attacked his personal character or medical
competence. The defendants were privileged to do so, and the article was not
defamatory.

Was The Plaintiff A Public Figure?

We find that the action of the trial court is supportable as well on the
ground that the plaintiff was a
“public figure” and failed to show malice towards himself in the publication of the article.
We turn to a discussion of this ground for summary judgment for the defendants.

 [**868]  During the hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the following colloquy
took place:

The Court: . . . I will
consider first the question: Is Dr. Exner a public figure as a matter of law?
If Dr. Exner is not a public figure as a matter of law, then there are
different consequences than if he is a public figure as a matter of law.

Dr. Exner: May I suggest I am most
definitely a public figure.

 

In a deposition considered by the court, the plaintiff stated:
“I am regarded all over the world as the world’s best informed authority on the
fluoridation fraud.” The evidence before the trial court on the motions reflected that
 [***11]  the plaintiff had been vigorously involved in fluoridation controversies since
1952, locally, nationally and internationally. Fluoridation is a public issue
which has been before the voters in numerous areas of the United States, is a
matter of public interest and, as to that issue, the plaintiff forcefully and
voluntarily placed himself in the public spotlight.

[3] A person’s claim that he is a public figure does
not make him so. He must have become one from his participation in public
matters. It is only then that he loses his safety from libel and slander
unless malice accompanies the act. The categorization of a person as a public
figure may

 [*221]  rest on either of two alternative bases. It was recently stated:

 

In some instances an individual
may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure
for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily
injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby
becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either
case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public
questions.

 

Gertz v. Robert Welch,
 [***12]  Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3013 (1974). Here, the defendant is not universally famous but is well known
among those involved in the argument over fluoridation. It is within this
orbit that the plaintiff has cast aside his mantle of privacy.

When citizens voluntarily expose themselves to the limelight, they may become
public figures. In addition to showing dissemination of a falsehood and
resultant damage, public figures must show that the publication was
made knowing it was false or with reckless disregard as to whether it was true
or false.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra;
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967);
Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 87 S. Ct. 1975 (1967);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964);
Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wn.2d 707, 459 P.2d 8 (1969).

Gertz further discusses the interplay between the need for free discussion of public
issues protected by the First Amendment and the right of persons to protect
themselves from defamation
thusly on pages 342-43:

 

Those
 [***13]  who, by reason of the notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success
with which they seek the public’s attention, are properly classed as public
figures and those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to
reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard for the truth. This

 [*222]  standard administers an extremely powerful antidote to the inducement to media
self-censorship of the commonlaw rule of strict liability for libel and
slander. And it exacts a correspondingly high price from the victims of
defamatory falsehood. Plainly many deserving plaintiffs, including some
intentionally subjected to injury,
will be unable to surmount the barrier of the
New York Times test. Despite this substantial abridgement of the state law right to
compensation for wrongful hurt to one’s reputation, the Court has concluded
that

 [**869]  the protection of the
New York Times privilege should be available to publishers and broadcasters of defamatory
falsehood concerning public officials and
public figures.

Private citizens do not become public figures subject to damaging
 [***14]  falsehoods concerning their lives without recourse when they are suddenly
thrust into the news by events. When chance and the news media bring a private
citizen into the public eye, the right to redress for defamation is not
diminished so
long as their notoriety was not of their own choosing. The right to recover
damages for the dissemination of untruths about themselves without proving
actual malice by the disseminator is retained. Even though the statements made
concern matters of public interest, the right to be left alone is not lessened
for the private
person.
See
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 380, 17 L. Ed. 2d 456, 87 S. Ct. 534 (1967). The requirement of proof of malice of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan does not extend to private individuals who have not risen to
public renown by their own activity.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra.

Miller v. Argus Publishing Co., 79 Wn.2d 816, 490 P.2d 101 (1971), relying upon
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 29 L. Ed. 2d 296, 91 S. Ct. 1811 (1971), indicated that one could be placed into the
“public figure” category when the comment about him involved a subject of general public
interest. The

 [***15] 
Rosenbloom case had enlarged the area of open comment under the First Amendment to
include not only
persons who were public officials or public figures but also those whose
private lives were

 [*223]  suddenly embroiled by chance in matters of public interest.
Rosenbloom has now been modified by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., which stated on page 345:

 

[T]he communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased
risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption
is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public
office or assumed an
“influential role in ordering society.”
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, . . . He has relinquished
no part of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and
consequently he has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury
inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more
vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also
more deserving of recovery.

Rosenbloom, the basis espoused in
Miller for
 [***16]  restricting defamation suits by private citizens incidentally involved in
public matters by requiring proof of malice, has now been limited by
Gertz on the side of permitting legal recourse against the news media to the
nonparticipating innocent bystander. It
follows that private individuals who have not become public figures may now
protect their reputations in state courts by legal remedy without proof of
malice and that the mandate of
Miller v. Argus Publishing Co. is likewise modified.
See
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra.

The
plaintiff, however, is not embroiled in the fluoridation controversy just by
commenting on a matter in which there is public interest, but he has taken upon
himself the role of attempting to order society insofar as the fluoridation
issue was concerned.
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra. As to this issue, we note the apropos
words of
Gertz on page 352:

 

Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and
pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be
deemed a public

 [*224]  personality for all aspects of his life. It is preferable to reduce the
public-figure question
 [***17]  to a more meaningful context
by looking to the nature and extent

 [**870]  of an individual’s participation in the particular controversy giving rise to
the defamation.

 

The plaintiff was a public figure in regard to the limited issue of
fluoridation by having abandoned his anonymity, by having assumed leadership
and by having attempted to influence the outcome of the issue. The reporters
of these activities could write
freely about this aspect of the plaintiff so long as they did not write with
malice.
See
Amsbury v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wn.2d 733, 458 P.2d 882 (1969).

Summary Judgment

[4] Summary judgment is to be granted in defamation cases as in other cases
only when there is no genuine issue as to a material fact.
McDonald v. Murray, 83 Wn.2d 17, 515 P.2d 151 (1973). Likewise, as in other cases, the evidence presented must be considered in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Amsbury v. Cowles Publishing Co., supra;
Hudesman v. Foley, 73 Wn.2d 880, 441 P.2d 532 (1968);
O’Brien v. Tribune Publishing Co., 7 Wn. App. 107, 499 P.2d 24 (1972);
Diel v. Beekman, 1 Wn. App. 874, 465 P.2d 212 (1970). However, the function
 [***18]  of the trial court in ruling on a defense motion for summary judgment in a
defamation action is to determine if the plaintiff’s proffered evidence is of a
sufficient quantum to establish a prima facie case with convincing
clarity. Unless the plaintiff has done so, the motion must be granted.
Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 19 L. Ed. 2d 248, 88 S. Ct. 197 (1967);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra;
Chase v. Daily Record, Inc., 83 Wn.2d 37, 515 P.2d 154 (1973).

To show that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth or
falsity of a statement, the plaintiff must submit evidence pursuant to CR 56
that the defendant entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
publication and published
anyway.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,
 [*225]  20 L. Ed. 2d 262, 88 S. Ct. 1323 (1968);
Tilton v. Cowles Publishing Co., supra. The proof before the trial court failed to establish malice with convincing
clarity. It is the duty of a
reviewing court to examine the total record to ascertain whether there exists
convincingly clear evidence of malice.
Mellor v. Scott Publishing Co., 10 Wn. App. 645, 519 P.2d 1010 (1974). When the affidavits,

 [***19]  admissions, exhibits and depositions submitted by the parties are considered
in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, the record is lacking in proof of malice on
the part of the defendants except for the unsupported allegations of the
plaintiff that malice existed. This is not sufficient to survive the challenge
of summary judgment in a defamation case brought by a public figure.
Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra. The plaintiff’s evidence advanced him no further than his pleadings and failed
to establish a knowledge or high degree of awareness of the probable falsity of
any statement in the article with convincingly clear proof.

The summary judgment of dismissal is affirmed.

Appendix

The article entitled
Why Doctors Vote Yes to Fluoridation by
Peter C. Goulding, Director, Bureau of Public Information, American Dental
Association, reads in part:

Is Fluoridation of public water supplies an effective method of reducing tooth
decay? Yes — says every authoritative health and scientific organization in
the country — the American Medical Association, the American
Dental Association, the American Association for the Advancement of Science,
and the U.S. Public Health Service
 [***20]  — plus fully 99 percent of the 250,000 physicians and 100,000 dentists in
this country.

. . .

Despite this overwhelming vote of confidence from virtually every medical,
dental, and scientific authority in our nation, and,

 [**871]  indeed the world . . .
fluoridation loses heavily in the ballot boxes of the American public.
Evolving as a political rather than a scientific issue, fluoridation has been
passed in only 334 of 852 community referendums during the past 15 years. . . .

How can this possibly happen?

 [*226]  First of all, perhaps, because no one ever
died of dental decay. Secondly, and certainly most significantly, because the
issue of fluoridation is being grossly misrepresented to the American public by
a shouting few. Specifically, the voters are being swayed in their thinking by
the loud and persistent shouts of
“poison.” . . . On this issue, therefore, the most important question the voter must
resolve is whether there is validity to the dissenter’s loud and persistent
shouting.

The House of Anti-Fluoridation has many rooms. Residents range from the
sincere to the charlatan, from the confused to the quack. Motives vary. Some
are cautious, sincere individuals;

 [***21]  others have an axe to grind. Methods vary too. Some would present their case
only in print and at a high level.
Others love a political battle and use emotional arguments exclusively.

. . .

The sincerity of pamphleteers — the so-called political crusaders — is more
difficult to judge. There still may be individuals who believe that
fluoridation is part of a gigantic conspiracy, that
fluorides are poisonous in any amount, and that their individual liberties are being
violated. When sincere, such
views usually are held by people who have been thoroughly misguided.

On the other hand, many of these alleged crusaders tie the emotion-charged
fluoridation controversy to other campaigns of fear, hate, and prejudice.
Extremist political agitators very often add attacks on fluoridation to their
many wild charges against the social order.
In short, they use the issue to sell pamphlets and their own particular social
and political quirks.

Motivations of health food faddists — devotees of health foods who
consistently wage vigorous campaigns against fluoridation — are more easily
analyzed. For some, the issue runs counter to their preachments on
“purity” of water. Others are
in
 [***22]  the business of selling health foods and the resultant publicity from their
attacks on fluoridation does not hurt their business one bit. Some of them are
also opposed to pasteurization and vaccination.

. . .

In addition, there are perhaps a handful of physicians and dentists who oppose
fluoridation. Often, they regard it as part of a larger picture of
“creeping socialism,” even
though the decision to fluoridate a water supply remains wholly within the
individual community. So be it. There are also physicians who are still
opposed to vaccination and pasteurization.

Perhaps the most frequently quoted
“professional” opponent to fluoridation is Dr. Frederick B. Exner of Seattle, Washington.
Having written a book on the subject, he has taken part
in court suits; he has brought suit himself; he has spoken in many parts of the
nation in opposition to fluoridation.

In reviewing the book,
American Fluoridation Experiment, published in 1957, which Doctor Exner co-authored with Dr. G. L. Waldbott,
the Royal Society of Health found:
“This
book cannot be

 [*227]  recommended to the reader in search of an objective evaluation of
fluoridation, although it will certainly offer an
 [***23]  attraction to those interested in the extremes of subjective criticism . . .
Readers who seek a verification of (Exner’s) charges will fail to find it.
Instead, they will find a strange melange varying from
vague generalities to downright misstatements.”

In its review of the book, the
Rocky Mountain Medical Journal noted that it
“plunges into a subject that is only vaguely concerned with the special practice
of either of the authors . . . This is one of the most peculiar books ever to
be offered

 [**872]  for serious consideration, either by scientists or lay persons.

“One of the authors attempted to show in a published report that a pronounced
stain had been produced in two persons, who, it was alleged, were raised on
Denver South Platte water — which consistently has contained one part per
million
fluorides,” the
Journal review continues.
“In a court of law
in another state, sometime over a year ago, it was determined that these two
persons had acquired the stain, not in Denver, but in other communities where
the water held an ‘excess of
fluoride.‘

“This episode is mentioned here only because the book stubbornly retains this
‘evidence’ despite its rejection by a
court
 [***24]  of law . . . There is hardly a paragraph in the book with which informed
opinion could agree,” the
Journal concludes.

Doctor Exner’s own medical organization, the King County (Washington) Medical
Society, voted 706 to 68 for fluoridation.

Doctor Exner’s opposition has been equally unacceptable in the courts. Despite
testimony
against the measure, a Washington State lower court and the State Supreme Court
upheld fluoridation. Instituting a suit against the Fluoridation League of
Chehalis, Washington, he attempted to obtain $ 1,000 which the group had
offered to anyone able to prove that fluoridation at one part per million
caused any ill
effects. The court rejected his plea.

Doctor Exner also testified in a court case in Chicago in which fluoridation
was again upheld.

Another frequently cited
“professional” opponent of fluoridation,
“Doctor” E. H. Bronner, was no doctor of medicine at all. Speaking in many cities at
the invitation of
various anti-fluoridation groups, he persuaded the city council of Clinton,
Iowa, to vote against fluoridation. After he had left, the city’s newspaper,
the
Clinton Herald, became curious enough to investigate the
“doctor’s” record. It
 [***25]  turned out that Bronner was at that time an escapee from a mental institution,
the Elgin State Hospital
in Elgin, Illinois. Bronner is one of the reasons why the city of Seattle,
Washington, does not now have fluoridation.

Other opponents to fluoridation have equally questionable credentials. Take
for example the widely quoted Oliver Kenneth Goff. A former Communist by his
own admission who
“knows all about them,” he has authored
a book called
Brain Washing, which was published by Defenders, Incorporated. Established by Gerald
Windrod,

 [*228]  this enterprise also publishes the
Defender magazine, which is characteristically anti-medical, anti-Communist,
anti-Catholic, and anti-Jewish. This organization has championed such useless
cancer treatments as the Koch preparation, the Hoxsey treatment, and the
“Laetrile” treatment. Goff has been connected with the group, in the past at least.

. . .

All of these men — some of whom are expert only as convicted quacks, or hate
mongers, or food faddists — all of them have fought fluoridation, with
astonishing success. They have beaten the scientists and the health agencies;
they have beaten your family physician and dentist.

 [***26]  Fluoridation has lost, not because of any question about its
effectiveness or safety but because men like this have been able to confuse,
frighten, and mislead.

Presently, more than 56 million persons are drinking water with the proper
amounts of
fluoride in it. Hopefully, your children number among them. However, in communities
where this issue — cited as the most proven measure in the history of public
health — remains to be settled, the ultimate decision rests with the voting
parents. Your physician and your dentist urge that you vote
“yes” to fluoridation.

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